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Abstract
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a social choice
function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents’
private types. The revelation principle asserts that if a social choice function can be
implemented by a mechanism in equilibrium, then there exists a direct mechanism
that can truthfully implement it.
This paper aims to propose a failure of the revelation principle. We point out that
in any game the format of each agent’s strategy is either an informational message
or a realistic action, and the action format is very common in many practical cases.
The main result is that: For any given social choice function, if the mechanism
which implements it has action-format strategies, then “honest and obedient” will
not be the equilibrium of the corresponding direct mechanism. Consequently, the
revelation principle fails when the format of each agent’s strategy is an action.
Key words: Mechanism design; Revelation principle.
1 Introduction
In the framework of mechanism design theory [1–3], there are one designer
and some agents labeled as 1, · · · , I. 1 Suppose that the designer would like
to implement a social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for
each possible profile of agents’ types, and each agent’s type is modeled as his
privacy. In order to implement a social choice function in equilibrium, the
designer constructs a mechanism which specifies each agent’s feasible strategy
Email address: 18621753457@163.com (Haoyang Wu).
1 In this paper, the designer is always denoted as “She”, and the agent is denoted
as “He”.
set (i.e., the allowed actions of each agent) and an outcome function (i.e., a
rule for how agents’ actions get turned into a social choice).
The revelation principle is an important theorem in mechanism design theory.
It asserts that if a social choice function can be implemented by a mechanism
in equilibrium, then it is truthfully implementable. So far, there have been
several criticisms on the revelation principle: Bester and Strausz [4] pointed
out that the revelation principle may fail because of imperfect commitment;
Epstein and Peters [5] proposed that the revelation principle fails in situations
where several mechanism designers compete against each other. Kephart and
Conitzer [6] proposed that when reporting truthfully is costless and misreport-
ing is costly, the revelation principle can fail to hold.
Different from these criticisms, this paper aims to propose another failure of
the revelation principle. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyses
two formats of strategy and points out that the action format is very common
in many practical cases. Section 3 proposes the main result, i.e., the revelation
principle fails when each agent’s strategy is action-format. Section 4 draws
conclusions. Notations about mechanism design theory are given in Appendix,
which are cited from Ref [1].
2 Two formats of strategy
Note 1: In any game, the format of each agent’s strategy is either an infor-
mational message or a realistic action. ✷
Although the note looks naive, it is not trivial. The reason why we emphasize
the distinction of two formats of strategy is that the revelation principle does
not hold for the case of action-format strategies, as will be discussed in Section
3. For simplification, in the following discussions we simply assume that in any
game all agents’ strategies are of the same format, i.e., we omit the case in
which some agents’ strategies are message-format and other agents’ strategies
are action-format. Next, we will deeply investigate the two formats of strategy
respectively.
2.1 Case 1: Mechanism with message-format strategies
Definition 1: A message-format strategy of an agent in a mechanism is a
strategy represented by an informational message. The information itself con-
tained in the message is just the agent’s strategy, which does not need to be
carried out realistically in the mechanism.
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Practically, only in some restricted cases can each agent’s strategy be described
as pure information and represented by an informational message. For exam-
ple, let us consider a chess game, then each player’s strategy is message-format,
since it is a strategic plan about how to play chess. Similarly, the strategy in
a war simulation game is also message-format, since it contains military plans
of players. However, in many practical cases each agent’s strategy cannot be
described as pure information but must be described as a realistic action. For
example, the strategy in a real war is action-format, since it contains military
actions of armies.
Definition 2: Given a social choice function f , suppose a mechanism Γ =
(S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements it in equilibrium with message-format strate-
gies. To clearly describe the case of message-format strategies, we denote each
strategy set Si as Mi, and each agent i’s strategy function as mi(·) : Θi → Mi,
where Θi is agent i’s type set. The outcome function g(·) is denoted as
gm(·) : M1 × · · · ×MI → X, where the input parameters are message-format
strategies and X is the set of outcomes. Hence, the mechanism Γ is denoted as
Γm = (M1, · · · ,MI , gm(·)). The game induced by Γm is denoted as Gm, which
works in a one-stage manner:
Step 1: By using the strategy function mi(·), each agent i with private type
θi sends a message mi(θi) to the designer.
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Step 2: The mechanism Γm yields the outcome gm(m1(θ1), · · · ,mI(θI)).
Here, each agent i’s utility is denoted as ui(gm(m1(θ1), · · · ,mI(θI)), θi).
Definition 3: Suppose the game Gm has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, de-
noted as m∗(·) = (m∗
1
(·), · · · ,m∗
I
(·)), i.e., for all i and all θi ∈ Θi, m̂i ∈ Mi,
Eθ
−i
[ui(gm(m
∗
i
(θi),m
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(gm(m̂i,m
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi].
Consider this equilibrium, there is a compound mapping from agents’ possible
types θ̂ = (θ̂1, · · · , θ̂I) ∈ Θ into the outcome gm(m
∗(θ̂)), which is equal to
f(θ̂). Based on the compound mapping, we construct a direct mechanism
Γ̄m = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , gm(m
∗(·))). 3
Definition 4: The direct mechanism Γ̄m induces a one-stage direct game Ḡm,
which works as follows:
Step 1: Each agent i with private type θi individually reports a type θ̂i ∈ Θi
2 In the following discussions, we denote each agent i’s true type as θi, and his any
possible type as θ̂i ∈ Θi.
3 Although gm(m
∗(θ̂)) = f(θ̂) for any θ̂ = (θ̂1, · · · , θ̂I) ∈ Θ, the outcome function
of the constructed direct mechanism Γ̄m must be the compound mapping gm(m
∗(·))
instead of f(·). The reason is straightforward: if the outcome function of Γ̄m is simply
written as f(·), then Γ̄m will become a naive direct mechanism (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , f(·)),
which is irrelevant to the original mechanism Γm = (M1, · · · ,MI , gm(·)), and indeed
cannot implement f(·) at all.
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to the designer. Here, each agent i does not need to be “honest”, i.e., θ̂i can
be different from agent i’s private type θi.
Step 2: By using the equilibrium strategy functionsm∗(·) = (m∗
1
(·), · · · ,m∗
I
(·)),
the direct mechanism Γ̄m calculates m
∗(θ̂) = (m∗
1
(θ̂1), · · · ,m
∗
I
(θ̂I)), and then
yields the outcome gm(m
∗(θ̂)).
Note 2: Obviously, m∗(θ̂) = (m∗
1
(θ̂1), · · · ,m
∗
I
(θ̂I)) are pure information, and
hence are message-format. Actually, only when each agent i’s strategy mi(·)
is message-format can the calculated results m∗(θ̂) be legal parameters of
the outcome function gm(·). As a comparison, when each agent’s strategy is
action-format, then any calculation about it will only be a message-format
description, but not a legal action-format strategy. ✷
Note 3: By Definition 3, since m∗(·) = (m∗
1
(·), · · · ,m∗
I
(·)) is the equilibrium
of the game Gm, then m
∗
i
(θi) is the optimal choice for each agent i given that
all other agents send m∗
−i
(θ−i). Therefore, in the direct game Ḡm, each agent
i will find truth-telling θ̂i = θi to be the optimal choice given that the others
agents tell the truth θ̂−i = θ−i, and the final outcome will be gm(m
∗(θ)),
which is equal to f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Thus, for the case of message-format
strategies, truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct game
Ḡm. Consequently, the revelation principle holds when each agent’s strategy is
message-format. ✷
2.2 Case 2: Mechanism with action-format strategies
Definition 5: An action-format strategy of an agent in a mechanism is a s-
trategy represented by a realistic action, which should be performed by himself
practically.
For example, let us consider a tennis game, then each player’s strategy is his
realistic action of playing tennis, but not any informational plan of how to play
tennis. Another interesting example is the auction. At first sight, each bidder’s
bid is pure information and looks like a message-format strategy. However, in
many practical cases, only the bid information itself is not enough to be a
full strategy of the auction. Besides announcing a message-format bid, each
bidder’s strategy should include performing a realistic action (e.g., paying his
bid to the auctioneer) if he wins the auction. Hence, in many practical cases,
an auction is indeed a game with action-format strategies.
Definition 6: Given a social choice function f , suppose a mechanism Γ =
(S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements it in equilibrium with action-format strategies.
To clearly describe the case of action-format strategies, we denote each strat-
egy set Si as Ai, and each agent i’s strategy function as ai(·) : Θi → Ai. The
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outcome function g(·) is denoted as ga(·) : A1×· · ·×AI → X, where the input
parameters are action-format strategies. Hence, the mechanism Γ is denoted
as Γa = (A1, · · · , AI , ga(·)). The game induced by Γa is denoted as Ga, which
works in a one-stage manner:
Step 1: By using action-format strategy functions (a1(·), · · · , aI(·)), agents
1, · · · , I with private types (θ1, · · · , θI) perform the action-format strategies
(a1(θ1), · · · , aI(θI)).
4
Step 2: The mechanism Γa yields the outcome ga(a1(θ1), · · · , aI(θI)).
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Here, each agent i’s utility is denoted as ui(ga(a1(θ1), · · · , aI(θI)), θi).
Definition 7: Suppose the game Ga has an equilibrium a
∗(·) = (a∗
1
(·), · · · ,
a∗
I
(·)), i.e., for all i and all θi ∈ Θi, âi ∈ Ai,
Eθ
−i
[ui(ga(a
∗
i
(θi), a
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(ga(âi, a
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi].
Consider this equilibrium, there is a compound mapping from agents’ possible
types θ̂ = (θ̂1, · · · , θ̂I) ∈ Θ into the outcome ga(a
∗(θ̂)), which is equal to
f(θ̂). Based on the compound mapping, we construct a direct mechanism
Γ̄a = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗(·)).
Definition 8: According to Myerson [2], the direct mechanism Γ̄a induces a
multistage direct game Ḡa, which works as follows:
Step 1: Each agent i with private type θi individually reports a type θ̂i ∈ Θi.
Here each agent does not need to be “honest”, i.e., θ̂i can be different from θi.
Step 2: The designer returns a suggestion to each agent i, here the suggestion
is just the message-format description of action a∗
i
(θ̂i) ∈ Ai. In order to specify
the suggestion’s format more clearly, we denote the suggestion as am
i
(θ̂i);
Step 3: Each agent i individually performs an action âi ∈ Ai. Here each agent
i does not need to be “obedient”, i.e., âi can be different from a
m
i
(θ̂i).
Step 4: After observing that all actions â1, · · · , âI have been performed, the
direct mechanism Γ̄a yields the outcome ga(â1, · · · , âI).
Here, each agent i’s utility is denoted as ui(ga(â1, · · · , âI), θi).
Note 4: Generally speaking, each agent’s private type is his privacy and hence
has a positive value to him. Consider Step 1 in Definition 8, each agent i
reports a type, either honestly or dishonestly. Note that choosing to be honest
or dishonest is each agent’s independent and private choice, and cannot be
controlled by the designer. Hence, from each agent’s perspective, if the utility
of truth-telling is not larger than but only equal to the utility of false-telling,
then any reasonable agent will prefer false-telling, because false-telling always
4 For the case of action-format strategies, the designer observes the performance
of each agent’s action. As a comparison, for the case of message-format strategies,
the designer receives each agent’s message.
5 If in the mechanism Γa some agent i only declares a message about how to perform
an action but does not realistically perform it, then this declaration is meaningless.
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hides his privacy, which will be attractive to him. ✷
Note 5: Consider Step 3 in Definition 8, after receiving the designer’s sugges-
tion, each agent performs an action either obediently or disobediently. Note
that choosing to be obedient or disobedient is each agent’s independent and
open choice. Although each agent’s action can be observed by the designer,
she cannot punish any disobedient agent in Step 4 since the designer has no
such power in the framework of mechanism design theory. ✷
3 Main results
Consider the multistage direct game Ḡa induced by the direct mechanism Γ̄a
described in Definition 8. According to Myerson [2], the strategy “honest and
obedient” is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game Ḡa: i.e., each agent i
not only honestly discloses his private type in Step 1 (i.e., θ̂i = θi), but also
obeys the designer’s suggestion in Step 3 (i.e., âi = a
m
i
(θi)). However, in this
section we will point out that Myerson’s conclusion will not hold when each
agent’s strategy is of an action format.
Proposition 1: For any given social choice function f(·) : Θ → X, sup-
pose there is a mechanism that implements it in Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
in which each agent’s strategy is of an action format. Then f will not be
truthfully implementable, i.e., in the multistage direct game induced by the
corresponding direct mechanism, “honest and obedient” will no longer be the
equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose the mechanism Γa = (A1, · · · , AI , ga(·)) implements the social
choice function f(·) : Θ → X in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which each
agent’s strategy is of an action format. By Definition 6 it induces a one-stage
game Ga, the equilibrium of which is denoted as a
∗(·) = (a∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)),
and ga(a
∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Thus, there is a corresponding direct
mechanism Γ̄a = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗(·))) given by Definition 7 and a direct
game Ḡa given by Definition 8. In Step 1 of the direct game Ḡa, there are
different cases for agents 1, · · · , I.
Case 1: Each agent chooses to be honest
Consider each agent i chooses to be “honest” in Step 1 of Ḡa (i.e., θ̂i = θi),
then in Step 2 of Ḡa, the suggestion to each agent i will be a
m
i
(θi). Since
the equilibrium of Ga is a
∗(·) = (a∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)), then the optimal choice of
each agent i in Step 3 of Ḡa is to be “obedient” (i.e., obeying the suggestion
am
i
(θi) and performing the action a
∗
i
(θi)), given that the others also choose to
be “obedient”. In Step 4 of Ḡa, the final outcome will be ga(a
∗(θ)), which is
equal to f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
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Case 2: One agent chooses to be dishonest and the others choose to be honest
Consider in Step 1 of Ḡa there is one agent i that wants to protect his privacy
and chooses to be “dishonest”, and the others still choose to be “honest” (i.e.,
θ̂i ̸= θi, θ̂−i = θ−i). Then in Step 2 of Ḡa, the suggestion to agent i will be
am
i
(θ̂i) ̸= a
m
i
(θi), and the suggestions to the others will still be a
m
−i
(θ−i).
Since the equilibrium of Ga is a
∗(·) = (a∗
1
(·), · · · , a∗
I
(·)), then the optimal
choice for agent i in Step 3 of Ḡa will be “disobedient” (i.e., not obeying the
suggestion am
i
(θ̂i) but still performing a
∗
i
(θi)). And the optimal choices for
other agents will still be “obedient” (i.e., performing a∗
−i
(θ−i)).
By Note 5, although in Step 4 of Ḡa the designer can find agent i is disobedient,
she cannot punish him. In the end, the direct mechanism Γ̄a will yield the
outcome ga(a
∗(θ)), which is equal to f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
It can be seen from Case 1 and Case 2 that when agents 1, · · · , i−1, i+1, · · · , I
choose to be honest, then no matter whether agent i chooses “honest” or
“dishonest” in Step 1 of Ḡa, the optimal action for agent i in Step 3 of Ḡa
will always be a∗
i
(θi). Obviously, from agent i’s viewpoint, “dishonest” chosen
in Case 2 is better than “honest” chosen in Case 1, because he can obtain
the same outcome ga(a
∗(θ)) and at the same time hide his private type θi.
Furthermore, Case 2 can be generalized to everyone as follows.
Case 3: Each agent chooses to be dishonest
Consider each agent i chooses to be “dishonest” in Step 1 of Ḡa (i.e. reporting
a false type θ̂i ̸= θi), and then chooses to be “disobedient” in Step 3 of Ḡa
(i.e., not obeying the designer’s suggestion am
i
(θ̂i) but still performing a
∗
i
(θi)).
Then, the final outcome will still be ga(a
∗(θ)), which is equal to f(θ) for all
θ ∈ Θ. As a result, f(·) is implemented by the constructed direct mechanism
Γ̄a = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗(·))), not truthfully but dishonestly. Obviously, each
agent’s private type is hidden. Hence, from each agent’s perspective, “dishonest
and disobedient” chosen in Case 3 is strictly better than “honest and obedient”
chosen in Case 1.
To sum up, when the format of each agent’s strategy is an action, “honest
and obedient” will no longer be the equilibrium strategy of the corresponding
direct mechanism Γ̄a = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , ga(a
∗(·))). Hence the revelation principle
does not hold when each agent’s strategy is action-format. ✷
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose that in any game there are two formats of strate-
gy (i.e., an informational message or a realistic action), and the action for-
mat is common in many practical cases. In Section 2.1 we point out that
the revelation principle holds when each agent’s strategy is of message for-
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mat. However, when each agent’s strategy is of an action format, “honest and
obedient” will no longer be the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the multistage
direct game induced by the corresponding direct mechanism. Therefore, the
revelation principle fails when each agent’s strategy is of action format.
Appendix: Notations and Definitions
Let us consider a setting with one designer and I agents indexed by i =
1, · · · , I. Each agent i privately observes his type θi that determines his pref-
erence over elements in an outcome set X. The set of possible types for agent
i is denoted as Θi. The vector of agents’ types θ = (θ1, · · · , θI) is drawn from
set Θ = Θ1 × · · · × ΘI according to probability density φ(·), and each agent
i’s utility function over the outcome x ∈ X given his type θi is ui(x, θi) ∈ R.
Definition 23.B.1 A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Θ1×· · ·×
ΘI → X that, for each possible profile of the agents’ types θ1, · · · , θI , assigns
a collective choice f(θ1, · · · , θI) ∈ X.
Definition 23.B.3 A mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) is a collection of I
strategy sets S1, · · · , SI and an outcome function g : S1 × · · · × SI → X.
The mechanism combined with possible types (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI), the probability
density φ(·) over the possible realizations of θ ∈ Θ1 × · · · × ΘI , and utility
functions (u1, · · · , uI) defines a Bayesian game of incomplete information. The
strategy function of each agent i in the game induced by Γ is a private function
si(θi) : Θi → Si. Each strategy set Si contains agent i’s possible strategies.
The outcome function g(·) describes the rule for how agents’ strategies get
turned into a social choice.
Definition 23.B.5 A direct mechanism is a mechanism Γ̄ = (S̄1, · · · , S̄I , ḡ(·))
in which S̄i = Θi for all i and ḡ(θ) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
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Definition 23.D.1 A strategy profile s∗(·) = (s∗
1
(·), · · · , s∗
I
(·)) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) if, for all i and all θi ∈
Θi, ŝi ∈ Si, there exists
Eθ
−i
[ui(g(s
∗
i
(θi), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(g(ŝi, s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi].
Definition 23.D.2 The mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements the
social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
6 The bar symbol is used to distinguish the direct mechanism from the indirect
mechanism.
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Nash equilibrium of Γ, s∗(·) = (s∗
1
(·), · · · , s∗
I
(·)), such that g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for
all θ ∈ Θ.
Definition 23.D.3 The social choice function f(·) is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian incentive compatible) if s̄∗
i
(θi) = θi
(for all θi ∈ Θi and i = 1, · · · , I) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct
mechanism Γ̄ = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , f(·)). That is, if for all i = 1, · · · , I and all
θi ∈ Θi, θ̂i ∈ Θi,
Eθ
−i
[ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(f(θ̂i, θ−i), θi)|θi].
Proposition 23.D.1 [1]: (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash E-
quilibrium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that
implements the social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f(·) is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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